Financial evolution and the long-run behavior of velocity : new evidence from U.S. regional data by Peter N. Ireland
Financial  Evolution  and  the 
Long-Run  Behavior  of  Velocity: 
New  Evidence  from  U.S.  Regional  Data 
Peter N.  Ii-eland’ 
I.  INTR~IXJC~T+I~N 
Monetary  economists  have  devoted  considerable 
effort  to  establishing  a  link  between  the  financial 
innovations  of  the  past  two  decades  and  the  coin- 
cident  instability  of conventional  econometric  money 
demand  specifications.  i They  have  paid  little  atten- 
tion,  in contrast,  to the  more  general  question  of how 
financial  developments  may  have  influenced  the  de- 
mand  for  money  over  longer  periods  of U.S.  mone- 
tary  history.  Thus,  one  survey  of the  literature  notes, 
new  hypotheses  about  the  effects  of financial  innova- 
tion  “have  for the  most  part  been  tested  on the  same 
body  of data  that  suggested  them  in the  first  place” 
uudd  and  Scadding  (1983,  p.10011.  It  is  unclear 
whether  these  hypotheses  can  be  useful  in  under- 
standing  the  effects  of  earlier  innovations  or  in 
predicting  the  effects  of  future  innovations. 
The  utility  of a stable  econometric  money  demand 
function,  however,  lies  precisely  in  its  ability  to 
forecast  out-of-sample  so as to indicate,  for instance, 
what  rate  of nominal  money  growth  will  be  consis- 
tent  with  a desired  rate  of  inflation.  A  satisfactory 
theory  attributing  changes  in  money  demand  to 
innovations  in  the  financial  sector  must  therefore 
account  for  the  effects  of  a  long  history  of  past 
innovations  and be able to predict  the  effects  of future 
innovations.  Such  a  theory  has  recently  been 
developed  and  tested  by  Michael  Bordo  and  Lars 
l  Thanks  go  to  Marvin  Goodfriend,  Robert  Hetzel,  Tom 
Humphrey,  Jeff  Lacker,  Barbara  Mace,  and  Richard  Manning 
for making  helpful  suggestions,  and  to Andy  Atkeson  and  Rachel 
van  Elkan  for  providing  unpublished  worksheets  containing 
regional  demand  deposit  data.  The  opinions  expressed  herein 
are  those  of the  author  and  do  not  necessarily  reflect  those  of 
the  above-mentioned  individuals,  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Richmond,  or  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
1 The  first  among  recent  empirical  studies  to  attribute  money 
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Jonung  (1987,  1990)  as part  of an extensive  research 
project  on  the  long-run  behavior  of  the  income  ve- 
locity  of  money.2 
Bordo  and Jonung  suggest  that  the  institutional  and 
financial  factors  that  systematically  influence  the  de- 
mand  for  money  in  an  economy  over  the  entire 
course  of  its  development  are  of two  types.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  process  of monetization-meaning  the 
growth  of  the  commercial  banking  system  in  addi- 
tion  to the  expansion  of formal  market  activity  at the 
expense  of barter  and production  for own  use-ought 
to  increase  the  demand  for  money  as  an  economy 
grows.  On  the  other  hand,  the  emergence  of a variety 
of  nonbank  financial  intermediaries  offering  assets 
that  potentially  substitute  for  money  and  the  inven- 
tion  of cash  management  techniques  used  to  econo- 
mize  on  real  balances  ought  to  have  the  opposite 
effect  of  lowering  money  demand.  Bordo  and 
Jonung’s  hypothesis  is  that  the  first  set  of  effects 
will  dominate  early  in  the  course  of  economic 
development  but  will be  eclipsed  by  the  second  set 
in later  stages  of growth;  velocity  will therefore  tend 
to trace  out  a U-shaped  pattern  over  time.  In recently 
published  work  [Bordo  and  Jonung  (1987,  1990)], 
they  provide  evidence  that  this  pattern  can  indeed 
be  found  in  both  U.S.  and  international  data. 
This  paper  shows  how  Bordo  and  Jonung’s 
hypothesis  derives  from  traditional  theories  of  ve- 
locity’s  long-run  behavior.  It  then  discusses  some 
objections  that  have  been  raised  in  reviews  of  their 
empirical  work.  In  response  to  these  objections,  it 
examines  a new  data  set  containing  figures  for  de- 
mand  deposit  velocity  by  region  in the  United  States 
since  1929.  Regression  equations  estimated  with  the 
new  data  support  Bordo  and  Jonung’s  theory.  The 
2 The  income  velocity  of  money  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of 
national  income  (in nominal  terms)  to the  nominal  money  supply. 
It  is  therefore  a  convenient  measure  of  how  money  demand 
compares  to  income,  with  lower  money  demand  relative  to 
income  translating  into  higher  velocity  and  vice  versa. 
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an  explanation  for  the  recent  weakness  in  Ml  ve- 
locity.  These  results  suggest  that  the  new  data  set 
represents  a valuable  untapped  source  of evidence 
with which  a variety  of hypotheses  about  the behavior 
of velocity  can  be  tested. 
II.  THEORIES OFVELOCITY% 
LONGRUNBEHAVIOR 
Figure  1 displays  the  long-run  behavior  of the  in- 
come  velocity  of the  U.S.  monetary  aggregate  Ml, 
using  gross  national  product  as  the  measure  of  in- 
come.3  It shows  that  Ml  velocity  declined  secularly 
from  1869  until  the  end  of World  War  II  and  has 
risen  secularly  since  then. 
The  downward  trend  in velocity  prior  to  1945,  as 
well  as the  short-run  movements  that  accompanied 
it,  is  documented  in  great  detail  by  Friedman  and 
Schwartz  (1963).4  They  propose  that  real  money 
balances  be  viewed  as  a  luxury  good,  having  an 
income  elasticity  in  excess  of  unity,  and  therefore 
3 All  data  sources  are  listed  in  the  appendix. 
4 Friedman  and  Schwartz  use  M2  as  their  empirical  definition 
of money.  The  long-run  behavior  of M2,  however,  does  not diier 
substantially  from  that  of  Ml  until  after  World  War  II,  when 
MZ  velocity  levels  off  and  Ml  velocity  rises  sharply.  Thus, 
Friedman  and  Schwartz’s  explanation  of  M2  velocity’s  initial 
downward  trend  works  equally  well  in  explaining  the  prewar 
behavior  of  Ml. 
attribute  the  secular  decline  in velocity  to  the  con- 
current  secular  rise  in real  income.  To  explain  the 
trend’s  subsequent  reversal,  which  at the  time  their 
volume  was  written  had  only  just  begun,  Friedman 
and Schwartz  point  to postwar  expectations  of greater 
economic  stability that  worked,  they  said, to decrease 
the  demand  for  money  as  a  safe  and  highly  liquid 
asset. 
Friedman  and  Schwartz’s  luxury  good  hypothesis 
became  increasingly  difficult  to  apply  in  explaining 
the  postwar  behavior  of M 1 as its velocity  continued 
to  rise.  Thus,  a  number  of  researchers,  including 
LatanC  (1960),  Meltzer  (1963),  and  Lucas  (1988) 
argue  instead  for  a unitary  income  elasticity  and  a 
significantly  negative  interest  rate  elasticity  of 
money  demand,  thereby  implying  that  movements 
in velocity  are directly  attributable  to movements  in 
interest  rates.  In  their  later  work,  Friedman  and 
Schwartz  (1982)  also include  an interest  rate variable 
in regression  equations  used  to describe  the  demand 
for  money  in  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom  from  1869  to  1975.  Figure  2, which  shows 
the  behavior  of the  commercial  paper  rate from  1869 
to  1989,  does  suggest  the  existence  of  a  close 
velocity-interest  rate  relationship,  as both  variables 
trace  out  U-shaped  patterns  over  time. 
After  studying  the  long-run  demand  for money  in 
two  countries,  however,  Friedman  and  Schwartz 
(1982)  conclude  that  movements  in velocity  cannot 
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be  attributed  exclusively  to  movements  in  income 
and  interest  rates.  Figure  3  displays  the  Friedman- 
Schwartz  M2  velocity  and  interest  rate  data  for 
the United  States  and the United  Kingdom from  1880 
to  1910.5  Although  interest  rates  in both  countries 
moved  within  a  narrow  range,  velocity  fell  sharply 
in  the  United  States  while  remaining  remarkably 
stable in Britain. Friedman  and Schwartz  (pp.  146-47) 
explain  the  divergence  in the  two  velocity  series  by 
noting  that  while  in  1880  the  United  Kingdom’s 
economy  was far more  financially  sophisticated  than 
that  of  the  United  States,  by  1910  this  gap  had 
narrowed: 
From  1880  to  1910,  the  United  States  population  nearly 
doubled,  but  the  number  of  banks  multiplied  more  than 
sevenfold.  The  fraction  of the  population  residing  in rural 
areas  had  declined  from  over  two-thirds  to  only  a bit  over 
one-half;  the  fraction  of the  work  force  in  agriculture  had 
declined  from  one-half  to  less  than  one-third.  .  .  . 
.  . . the  change  in relative  financial  sophistication  of the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  .  .  . was  probably 
by  all odds  the  single  most  important  factor  accounting  for 
the  divergent  trends  in  real  balances. 
By  using  a  dummy  variable  in  their  two-country 
model  to  capture  the  effects  of  changing  levels  of 
financial  sophistication  in the  United  States  relative 
to  Britain  during  the  late  nineteenth  and  early 
5 Friedman  and Schwartz  use  net national product  as the  measure 
of  income  in  computing  velocity  for  both  countries.  Their 
interest  rates  are  the  six-month  commercial  paper  rate  for  the 
United  States  and  the  three-month  bill  rate  for  the  United 
Kingdom. 
twentieth  centuries,  Friedman  and Schwartz  take  an 
approach  to modifying  a money  demand  equation  that 
mirrors  the  approach  taken  by many  others  to repair 
conventional  money  demand  specifications  for  the 
most  recent  two  decades:  they  acknowledge  that  in 
one  instance  financial  innovation  has  apparently 
shifted  the  relationship  between  income,  interest 
rates,  and  the  demand  for money,  without  consider- 
ing  the  possibility  that  other  episodes  of instability 
in this  relationship  may  have  occurred  and  may  yet 
occur.  Friedman  and Schwartz’s  approach  is, in fact, 
exactly  the  same  as that  of Hafer  and  Hein  (1982), 
who  use period-specific  dummy  variables  to restore 
stability  to  a money  demand  equation  for  the  years 
following  1973. 
Bordo  and Jonung’s  hypothesis,  in contrast,  views 
all observed  episodes  of money  demand  instability 
as  symptomatic  of  an  ongoing  process  of  financial 
evolution;  indeed,  their  hypothesis  suggests  that  it 
is not appropriate  to regard  money  demand  instability 
as  episodic  at  all,  but  rather  as  a  predictable  and 
regular  phenomenon.  That  is,  the  Bordo-Jonung 
hypothesis  implies that  when  the  demand  for money 
equation  is properly  specified  to  include  proxies  for 
their  two  types  of ongoing  financial  innovation,  the 
equation  will be stable  for the  189Os, the  198Os, and 
all  decades  in  between  without  needing  period- 
specific  variables.  Thus,  Bordo  and  Jonung’s  work 
both  acknowledges  and extends  that of Friedman  and 
Schwartz  and  those  who  have  studied  the  effects  of 
more  recent  financial  innovations. 
18  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1991 Figure  3 
M2  VELOCITY 
The  idea  that  financial  innovations  may 
systematically  influence  velocity  over  long  periods 
of time  is not  solely Bordo  and Jonung’s.  In fact, they 
give  credit  to  Knut  Wicksell,  who  argues  (1936, 
Ch.  6,  Sec.  C)  that  the  velocity  of currency  is likely 
to increase  as an economy’s  banking  system  develops, 
for inspiring  their  work.  Irving  Fisher  (1963,  Ch.  V, 
Sec.  3)  lists  among  the  determinants  of  velocity 
“habits  as to  the  use  of book  credit  and  to  the  use 
of checks,”  both  of which  have  varied  considerably 
over  time.  Warburton  (1949),  who  finds  that  the 
initial  downward  trend  in velocity  seen  in Figure  1 
extends  back  to  1799,  attributes  the  trend  to changes 
such  as the  increase  in the  share  of national  output 
sold  in organized  markets,  the  increase  in the  frac- 
tion  of the  population  working  for wages  instead  of 
producing  for  their  own  consumption,  and  the  in- 
crease  due  to  specialization  in the  number  of inter- 
mediate  payments  required  in production,  all of which 
Bordo  and  Jonung  would  classify  as  aspects  of the 
monetization  process.  Among  more  recent  studies, 
both  Townsend,  (1987)  and  Goodfriend  (1991) 
describe  how  improvements  in communications  and 
information-gathering  technologies  facilitate  the 
substitution  of  privately  issued  securities  for  cur- 
rency  as  means  of payment;  their  analyses  suggest 
that  technological  progress  may simultaneously  drive 
the  process  of real  economic  growth  and  allow  the 
payments  system  to  evolve  over  time.  Bordo  and 
Jonung’s  work  is unique,  however,  in the  extent  to 
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which it attempts  to find quantitative  evidence,  drawn 
from  a variety  of  data  sources,  in  support  of  their 
hypothesis. 
III.  EVIDENCEOFVELOCITYS 
LONGRUNBEHAVIOR 
Bordo  and  Jonung  take  four  distinct  approaches 
to document  that  the  financial  evolution  that  accom- 
panies  the  process  of real  economic  growth  exerts 
an  ongoing  systematic  influence  on  velocity’s  long- 
run  behavior.  First,  the  authors  show  that,  as 
predicted  by  their  theory,  the  U-shaped  velocity 
pattern  found  in Figure  1 for  the  United  States  can 
be  found  in  data  from  a number  of other  countries 
as well.  Second,  they  modify  the  traditional  regres- 
sion  equation  expressing  velocity  as  a  function  of 
income  and  interest  rates  by  adding  proxies  for the 
two types  of institutional  changes  identified  by their 
hypothesis.  The  ratio of M2 to currency  and the frac- 
tion  of  the  labor  force  employed  outside  of  the 
agricultural  sector  should  both  increase  as part  of the 
monetization  process  and  therefore  have  a negative 
effect  on velocity.  Meanwhile,  the  ratio  of nonbank 
financial  assets  to  total  financial  assets  should  be  a 
proxy  for the  rise of nonbank  financial  intermediaries 
and  the  development  of  money  substitutes  and 
therefore  have  a positive  effect  on  velocity.  When 
estimated  using  data  extending  back  into  the  nine- 
teenth  century  for  Canada,  Norway,  Sweden,  the 
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sion  coefficients  on  these  three  proxies  all have  the 
expected  signs. 
Next,  Bordo  and  Jonung  focus  in  detail  on  the 
monetization  process  as it occurred  in Sweden  from 
1871  to  1913.  They  show  that  a  number  of  other 
proxies  for institutional  change,  including  the number 
of commercial  bank  accounts  per  capita  and the  share 
of agricultural  wages  paid  in cash,  enter  significantly 
into  regression  equations  for velocity.  Finally,  they 
show  that  evidence  of U-shaped  velocity  patterns  can 
be  found  in cross-sectional  data  from  84  countries; 
those  with  low  levels  of  income  per  capita  have 
tended  to  experience  falling  velocity  in the  postwar 
years,  while  those  with  more  developed  economies 
have  recently  seen  velocity  rise  over  time. 
In  spite  of  their  success  in  presenting  an  exten- 
sive  and  diverse  body  of evidence  to  support  their 
hypothesis,  Bordo  and  Jonung  have  not  escaped 
criticism.  Reviewers  have  found  problems  with  their 
empirical  work,  with  most  of the  criticism  directed 
at  the  augmented  velocity  equations  estimated  for 
the  five  advanced  industrialized  countries.  Raj  and 
Siklos  (1988),  in commenting  on  an earlier  presen- 
tation  of  Bordo  and  Jonung’s  results  [Bordo  and 
Jonung  (1981)],  warn  that  the  significance  of  the 
institutional  variables  in the  velocity  equations  may 
be  the  product  of a spurious  regression  rather  than 
a true  economic  relationship.  Granger  and  Newbold 
(1986,  pp.  20516)  demonstrate  that  standard  test 
statistics  from  a  regression  of  one  random  walk 
variable  on  another,  independent  random  walk 
variable  will  often  incorrectly  suggest  that  the  two 
are  correlated.  Since  Raj  and  Siklos  find  that  the 
variables  in Bordo  and Jonung’s  regressions  behave 
like  random  walks,  the  test  statistics  from  these 
regressions  may  be  misleading.  Bordo  and Jonung’s 
proxies  continue  to be  significant  when  the  equations 
are  reestimated  in  first-differenced  form,  however. 
Because  differencing  serves  to  remove  the  random 
walk  component  from  each  variable,  Raj  and  Siklos 
conclude  that  the  test  results  are  probably  not 
spurious. 
In more  damaging  reviews,  Hamilton  (1989)  and 
Huizinga  (1990)  point  out  that  it  is  difficult  to 
defend  the  assumption,  made  implicitly  by Bordo  and 
Jonung  when  they  use  single-equation  econometric 
methods,  that  financial  variables  such  as  the 
MZ-currency  ratio  and  the  ratio  of  nonbank  finan-, 
cial  assets  to  all  financial  assets,  used  as  indepen- 
dent  variables  in  their  model,  are  truly  exogenous 
in  a  world  in  which  the  supply  of  as  well  as  the 
demand  for  money  and  other  assets  responds  to 
changes  in income  and interest  rates.  Both  Hamilton 
and  Huizinga  note,  for example,  that  the  ratio  of M2 
to currency  is approximately  equal  to the  M2  money 
multiplier.  If, through  the  reserve  decisions  of banks, 
the  money  multiplier  depends  on the nominal  interest 
rate,  Hamilton  (pp.  341-43)  demonstrates  that  the 
MZ-currency  ratio  may  appear  to  be  significant  in 
Bordo  and  Jonung’s  regressions  not  because  it  is 
standing  proxy  for  the  effects  of  monetization  on 
money  demand,  but  because  it  is  an  important 
variable  in  determining  money  supply.  Bordo  and 
Jonung’s  parameter  estimates,  therefore,  potentially 
suffer  from  simultaneous-equations  bias.‘j 
The  simultaneity  problem  is  a  difficult  one  to 
overcome  in the  study  of money  demand,  and  direct 
attempts  to  do  so  have  met  with  only  limited  suc- 
cess.’  In  fact,  by  repeating  their  analysis  with  a 
variety  of data  sets,  Bordo  and  Jonung  take  what  is 
perhaps  the  only  route  toward  establishing  that  their 
estimates  do  not  suffer  from  this  problem.  Indeed, 
Hamilton  (p.343)  admits  as  much: 
When  one  finds,  as  they  document,  evidence  of  a  con- 
sistent,  reproducible  pattern  that  is  robust  across  a  large 
number  of  specifications,  one  begins  to  establish  a  com- 
pelling  scientific  case  that  there  is  a predictable  regularity 
in  the  correlations  warranting  a  structural  interpretation. 
Likewise,  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (199 1) argue  that 
confidence  in  statistical  results  on  money  demand 
can be established  only by repeating  the  analysis with 
data  from  as many  time  periods  and  as many  coun- 
tries  as possible.  The  remainder  of this  paper  takes 
Hamilton’s  and  Friedman  and  Schwartz’s  advice: 
it  attempts  to  answer  the  critics  of  Bordo  and 
Jonung’s  empirical  work  by  looking  for  evidence  to 
support  their  financial-innovations  hypothesis  in  a 
new  data  set. 
IV. NEW  EVIDENCE  FROM 
U.S.  REGIONAL  DATA 
A. A New  Data Set 
Andy  Atkeson  and  Rachel  van  Elkan,  both  work- 
ing  at  the  University  of  Chicago,  have  recently 
6 Of  course,  the  effect  of interest  rates  on  reserve  decisions  is 
just  one  of  many  potential  sources  of  simultaneous-equations 
bias in  Bordo  and  lonune’s  work.  For  instance.  Goodfriend 
(1991)  describes  how  thgspread  of  the  commercial  banking 
system  and  the  coincident  development  of  interbank  credit 
markets  allow banks  to economize  on their  holdings  of reserves. 
Thus,  the  supply  of  as  well  as  the  demand  for  money  is  inti- 
mately  related  to  the  process  of  monetization. 
7 See  Goldfeld  and  Sichel  (1990)  for  a review  of work  on  the 
problems  of simultaneity  and  exogeneity  as  they  relate  to  the 
estimation  of money  demand  functions. 
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deposits  by  region  in  the  United  States  from  1929 
to  1988.  Along  with  the  Commerce  Department’s 
state  personal  income  data,  these  figures  may  be 
used  to  construct  series  for  demand  deposit  ve- 
locity  by  region  over  a 60-year  period.  The  Com- 
merce  Department’s  regional  definitions,  used  here, 
are  given  in Table  1. 
As the public’s currency  holdings  cannot  be broken 
down  geographically,  demand  deposit  velocity  is the 
closest  analog  to Ml  velocity  available  at the regional 
level.  Indeed,  Figure  4 reveals  that  the  U-shaped  pat- 
tern  found  in  the  aggregate  Ml  series  is  shared  by 
alI eight  regional  demand  deposit  velocity  series,  with 
velocity  in each  region  falling  before  World  War  II 
and  rising  thereafter. 
B.  Empirical Strategy 
Since  the  patterns  found  by  region  may  simply 
be  reflections  of  the  pattern  found  in  the  aggre- 
gate,  the  time-series  properties  of the  data  shown  in 
Figure  4 should  not  necessarily  be thought  of as pro- 
viding  new  and  independent  evidence  in support  of 
the  assertion  that  velocity  ought  to follow a U-shaped 
pattern  as an economy  develops.  There  is, however, 
considerable  variation  in  levels  of  velocity  across 
regions  at  any  given  point  in  time,  suggesting  the 
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Table  1 
Regional  Definitions, 
U.S.  Department  of Commerce 
New  England:  Connecticut,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  New 
Hampshire,  Rhode  Island,  Vermont 
Mideast:  Delaware,  District  of  Columbia,  Maryland,  New 
Jersey,  New  York,  Pennsylvania 
Great  Lakes:  Illinois,  Indiana,  Michigan,  Ohio,  Wisconsin 
Plains:  Iowa,  Kansas,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  North 
Dakota,  South  Dakota 
Southeast:  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Florida,  Georgia,  Kentucky, 
Louisiana,  Mississippi,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina, 
Tennessee,  Virginia,  West  Virginia 
Southwest:  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  Oklahoma,  Texas 
Rocky  Mountain:  Colorado,  Idaho,  Montana,  Utah,  Wyoming 
Far  West:  California,  Nevada,  Oregon,  Washington 
the  data  to  test  Bordo  and  Jonung’s  hypothesis. 
Specifically,  the  theory  predicts  that  for earlier  years 
(during  which  the  commercial  banking  system  was 
still expanding  geographically)  a negative  correlation 
should  be  observed  between  velocity  and  indexes  of 
Figure  4 
DEMAND  DEPOSIT  VELOCITY 
-  Rocky  Mountain 
--  Southwest 
-  Far  West 
1929  1939  1949  1959  1969  1979  1929  1939  1949  1959  1969  1979 
--  Great  Lakes 







FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  21 financial  sophistication  across  regions.  For  later 
years  (with the  spread  of nonbank  intermediaries)  this 
correlation  should  turn  positive. 
C.  Cross  Section Regression Equations 
State  personal  income  data  provide  two  proxies 
for  the  level  of  financial  development  by  region. 
The  first,  personal  income  per  capita,  is  a  simple 
proxy  under  the  assumption  that  the  processes  of 
real  economic  growth  and  financial  evolution  are 
synchronized.  The  second,  the  share  of total  earn- 
ings originating  in finance,  insurance,  and real estate 
(FIRE),  the  narrowest  industrial  class including  banks 
and  nonbank  financial  intermediaries  for which  data 
beginning  in  1929  are  available,  is  a  more  direct 
measure  of  financial  sophistication.  Although  the 
share  of earnings  in  FIRE  does  not  distinguish  be- 
tween  growth  in  banking  and  growth  in  nonbank 
finance,  such  a distinction  is not  necessary  because 
changes  in the  proxy  should  primarily  reflect  changes 
in banking  early  on and  changes  in nonbank  finance 
later. 
Let  vit denote  demand  deposit  velocity  in region 
i at time  t, PIPCit  denote  personal  income  per  capita 
in  region  i at  time  t,  and  FIREit  denote  the  share 
of total earnings  originating  in finance,  insurance,  and 
real  estate  in region  i at time  t.  Bordo  and Jonung’s 
hypothesis  predicts  that  vit should  be  negatively  cor- 
related  with  both  PIPCit  and  FIREit  for  early  t and 
positively  correlated  for  later  t.  Thus,  consider  the 
cross  section  regression  equations 
(1)  Vit  =  (1Yt +  &PIPCit  +  eit 
(2)  vit  =  6t  +  TtFIREit  +  uit’ 
to be  estimated  for each  t from  1929  to  1988  (a total 
of  120  regressions).  Bordo  and Jonung’s  hypothesis 
predicts  that  fit and -rt should  be negative  for the  early 
years  and  positive  later.  More  generally,  the  coeffi- 
cients  should  increase  as  functions  of  t.8 
D.  Results:  1929-1980 
Figure  4 reveals  that  the  Mideast  region  inclusive 
of New  York has considerably  lower levels  of velocity 
than  the  other  regions.  Comparing  the  numbers 
* For  the  reasons  given  in  Section  IV.B,  equations  (1)  and  (2) 
focus  only  on  the  cross-sectional  patterns  appearing  in  the 
regional  data.  An  alternative  and  perhaps  equally  informative 
approach  would  be  to  pool  all the  observations  in  the  data  set 
and  specify  a model  that  simultaneously  tests  both  the  cross- 
sectional  and  time-series  implications  of  Bordo  and  Jonung’s 
hypothesis.  This  task  is  left  for  future  research  efforts. 
for the  Mideast  as a whole  to  those  for the  Mideast 
excluding  New  York  State  indicates  that  it  is  the 
New  York  data  that  make  this  region  an  outlier. 
In  fact,  if  figures  for  New  York  are  included  in 
the  data  set  used  to  estimate  (1)  and  (Z),  they 
dominate  the  regressions,  generating  coefficients 
pt  and  -yt that  are  negative  for  all  t.  Including 
New  York  reveals  only  that  as  a  financial  center 
for  the  world,  New  York  City  has  a  high  concen- 
tration  of demand  deposits,  a high  level  of income 
per  capita,  and  a  large  fraction  of  its  labor  force 
employed  in  finance.  Thus,  the  data  for  the  Mid- 
east  region  exclusive  of  New  York  State,  used  to 
obtain  the  results  discussed  below,  are  more  in- 
formative  in  assessing  the  relevance  of the  Bordo- 
Jonung  hypothesis. 
Equations  (1)  and  (2)  are  estimated  by  ordinary 
least  squares.  The  slope  coefficients  /3 and  y  are 
plotted  as  functions  of t  in  Figure  5  to  see  if they 
increase  over  time  as  expected.  Since  each  coeffi- 
cient  is estimated  using  only  eight  observations,  the 
standard  errors  are quite  large.  The  point  estimates, 
however,  show  the  data  from  1929  to  1980  to  be 
consistent  with  Bordo  and Jonung’s  hypothesis.  The 
coefficients  follow  upward  paths  over  the  first  50 
years  for which  data  are  available;  for years  prior  to 
World  War  II they  are negative,  and after World  War 
II they  become  positive.  In fact,  beginning  in  1959 
for  p  and  in  1969  for  y,  the  slope  estimates  are  at 
least  one  standard  deviation  greater  than  zero. 
The  changes  that  underlie  the  switch  from negative 
to  positive  slope  coefficients  in  the  1940s  may  be 
seen  in Table  2.  Between  1942  and  1946,  velocity 
fell  in  every  region,  but  the  decline  was  less  pro- 
nounced  in New  England,  the  Mideast,  and the  Great 
Lakes  than  in  the  other  regions.  Attributing  these 
relative  changes  to  the  geographic  expansion  of the 
banking  system  is consistent  with  data  presented  in 
Goldsmith  (1958,  Ch.  V),  which  document  the 
spread  of  commercial  banking  from  the  northern 
United  States  to  the  South  and  West  during  1929- 
1949. 
E.  Results:  1981-1988 
In  contrast  to  the  first  50  years  of data,  the  most 
recent  figures  fail to display  the  pattern  predicted  by 
Bordo  and Jonung’s  theory,  with the  slope  coefficients 
falling over  time  and  even  becoming  negative  again. 
Driving  this  reversal,  as may  be  seen  in Table  3,  is 
declining  velocity  in the  more  financially sophisticated 
regions:  New  England,  the  Mideast,  and  the  Far 
West.  The  timing  of the  breakdown  in the  expected 
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Table  2  Table  3 
Changes  in  Demand  Deposit  Velocity 
1942-1946 
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I  , 
\  , 
New  England  -0.58  New  England  -  1.90 
Mideast  (excluding  New  York)  -0.65  Mideast  (excluding  New  York)  -0.66 
Great  Lakes  -  0.63  Great  Lakes  + 0.80 
Plains  -  1.26  Plains  + 1.58 
Southeast  -  1.93  Southeast  +0.97 
Southwest  -  1.51  Southwest  + 2.84 
Rocky  Mountain  -  1.97  Rocky  Mountain  + 2.73 
Far  West  -  1.60  Far  West  -0.16 
pattern  of coefficients  suggests  that  it may  be related 
to the coincident  break  in M 1 velocity’s postwar  trend 
(see  Figure  l),  which  has  received  considerable 
attention  in  the  money  demand  literature.9 
9 See,  for example,  Rasche  (1987),  Stone  and Thornton  (1987), 
Darby,  Mascara,  and  Marlow  (1989),  and  Hetzel  and  Mehra 
(1989). 
In  fact,  one  explanation  that  has  been  offered 
for  Ml  velocity’s  mysterious  behavior  is  also  con- 
sistent  with  the  surprising  cross-sectional  pattern 
to  have  emerged  in  the  past  decade.  Stone  and 
Thornton  (1987)  argue  that  the  weakness  in  Ml 
velocity  during  the  1980s  is most  likely  the  result 
of  two  distinct  forces.  First,  the  nationwide  intro- 
duction  of NOW  accounts  in  1981  attracted  funds 
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NOW  account  balances,  this  substitution  caused  its 
velocity  to  decrease.  Second,  if  the  demand  for 
money  is a function  of permanent  income  (or wealth) 
rather  than  current  income,  as suggested  by  Fried- 
man  (1959)  then  velocity  measured  using  current 
income  will  fall  as  permanent  income  increases 
relative  to current  income.  In particular,  expectations 
of improved  future  income  following  the  recessions 
of  the  early  1980s  can  explain  the  decrease  in 
measured  M 1 velocity. 
If  the  availability  of  NOW  accounts  has  drawn 
funds  out  of demand  deposits  as well  as out  of non- 
M 1 assets,  then  demand  deposit  velocity  should  have 
increased  even  as Ml  velocity  fell.  Table  3 reveals 
that,  in fact,  demand  deposit,velocity  did  continue 
to  rise  throughout  the  1980s  in regions  other  than 
New  England,  the  Mideast,  and  the  Far  West. 
Interest-bearing  checkable  deposits  were  available 
before  1981  in New  England  and New  Jersey,  so the 
nationwide  introduction  of these  accounts  would  not 
have  put  the  same  upward  pressure  on  velocity  in 
New  England  and the Mideast  region  (the two regions 
with  large  decreases  in velocity)  as it did elsewhere. 
Moreover,  patterns  in real estate  prices  suggest  that 
the  nationwide  increase  in wealth  during  the  1980s 
was concentrated  in New  England,  the  Mideast,  and 
the  Far  West,  putting  downward  pressure  in 
measured  velocity  through  the  permanent  income 
effect  in those  three  regions,  but  not  in the  others. 
Thus,  NOW  accounts  explain  why  velocity  rose  in 
some  regions,  while  changes  in permanent  income 
explain  why  velocity  fell in others;  together,  the  two 
parts  of Stone  and Thornton’s  hypothesis  explain why 
the  regression  coefficients  change  sign in the  1980s. 
If  Stone  and  Thornton’s  theory  is  correct,  the 
regional  regression  results  for  the  1980s  do  not 
contradict  Bordo  and  Jonung’s  hypothesis.  The 
introduction  of NOW  accounts  was  a consequence 
of  regulatory  change  rather  than  institutional  or 
technological  innovation,  for  interest-bearing 
checkable  deposits  existed  prior  to their  prohibition 
in  1933.  To  the  extent  that  regional  patterns  in 
velocity  during  the  1980s  are  the  product  of  this 
regulatory  change,  the  patterns  say nothing  about  the 
accuracy  of Bordo  and  Jonung’s  predictions  for  the 
effects  of financial evolution.  Since  Bordo  and Jonung 
use  permanent  income  as the  scale  variable  in their 
velocity  equations,  they  would  also  predict  that 
velocity  measured  using  current  income  would  fall 
when  permanent  income  increases;  regional  patterns 
induced  by  changes  in  permanent  income  are  not 
evidence  against  Bordo  and  Jonung’s  theory  either. 
On  the  other  hand,  since  deviations  of permanent 
income  from  current  income  are  by  definition  tran- 
sitory,  Bordo  and  Jonung’s  hypothesis  implies  that 
barring  further  significant regulatory  change,  the  slope 
coefficients  in  equations  (1)  and  (2)  should  soon 
become  positive  again.  Thus,  only  if the  experience 
of the  1980s is found,  in light of future  developments, 
to  be  an  exceptional  aberration  in  an  otherwise 
unbroken  pattern  will the  most  recent  data  help  in 
establishing  their  hypothesis  as  a  useful  guide  for 
predicting  the  effects  of  financial  innovation. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  empirical  results  obtained  here  show  Bordo 
and  Jonung’s  hypothesis  to  be  consistent  with  50 
years  of regional  demand  deposit  data  from  1929  to 
1980.  Although  the  figures  for  1981-1988  fail to fit 
the  expected  pattern,  they  have  an explanation  that 
is not  inconsistent  with the  Bordo-Jonung  hypothesis. 
Overall,  therefore,  the  regional  data  can  be  counted 
as part  of the  large  and diverse  body  of evidence  that 
Hamilton  (1989)  and Friedman  and  Schwartz  (199 1) 
argue  is  necessary  to  support  the  claim  that  the 
correlations  found  between  velocity  and  various 
proxies  for financial  sophistication  reflect  the  struc- 
tural  relationship  implied  by  Bordo  and  Jonung’s 
theory. 
In addition,  the  regional  figures  support  Stone  and 
Thornton’s  (1987)  explanation  for  the  weakness  in 
Ml  velocity  during  the  1980s.  This  finding  suggests 
that  regional  data  are  a valuable  untapped  source  of 
evidence  with which  competing  hypotheses  about  the 
recent  behavior  of Ml  can  be  tested.  In  particular, 
any  theory  that  purports  to  explain  the  fall  in  ve- 
locity  must  also  explain  why  this  reversal  in  trend 
has  been  confined  to  the  east  and  west  coasts. 
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MI,  United States,  1869-2892:  The  M 1 series  is ex- 
tended  back  to  1869  by  multiplying  M2  figures  by 
0.962,  the  ratio  of Ml  to M2  in  1892,  the  first year 
for which  Ml  data  is available.  The  M2  data  is taken 
from  Milton  Friedman  and  Anna  J.  Schwartz, 
Monetary  Trend  in  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom:  Thir  Relation to Income,  Prices,  and  Interest 
Rates,  2867-2975.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago 
Press,  1982.  Table  4.8,  Column  1. 28922914:  U.S. 
Bureau  of the  Census,  Hfitorical Stahl&  of the United 
States,  Coioniai  Times  to  1957.  Washington,  D.C., 
1960.  Series  X-267.  Adjusted  upward  to  link  with 
later  data.  1925-2970:  U.S.  Bureau  of the  Census, 
Historial  Statistics of the United States,  Colonial Times 
to  2970.  Washington,  D.C.,  1975.  Series  X-414. 
1971-1989:  Economic  Report  of  the  President. 
Washington,  D.C.,  1991.  Table  C-67. 
Gnxs  National  Pmduct,  United  States,  1869- 19.28: 
Nathan  S.  Balke  and  Robert  S.  Gordon,  “The 
Estimation  of  Prewar  Gross  National  Product: 
Methodology  and New  Evidence.”  .hmaLof  PO/i&al 
Economy 97  (February  1989):  38-92.  Table  10. 2929, 
I933,  1939-1989:  Economic  Report  of  the  President 
(1991).  Table  B-l.  2930-2932,  2934-2938:  U.S. 
Department  of Commerce,  Th  National Income and 
Product  Accounts  of  the  United  States,  I929-1982: 
Statistical  Tables.  Washington,  D.C.,  September 
1986.  Table  1.1. 
Six-Month  Commercial  Paper  Rate,  United  States, 
2869-2975:  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1982).  Table 
4.8,  Column  6.  2976-1989:  Economic  Report  of the 
President  (199 1).  Table  C-7 1. 
MZ  Velociity,  United  States,  2880-1920:  Friedman 
and  Schwartz  (1982).  Table  4.8,  Column  1 (MZ) 
divided  by  Column  2  (Net  National  Product). 
MZ  Wocity,  United Kingdom,  2880-2920:  Friedman 
and  Schwartz  (1982).  Table  4.9,  Column  1 (MZ) 
divided  by  Column  2  (Net  National  Product). 
Three-Month  Bil  Rate,  United  Kingdom,  2880-1920: 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1982).  Table  4.9,  Column 
6. 
Demand  Deposits by Region,  United States,  1929- 2 988: 
Unpublished  worksheets  compiled  by Andy  Atkeson 
and Rachel  van Elkan.  For  1929-1949,  their  data are 
figures  for total  demand  deposits  less  interbank  and 
federal  government  demand  deposits  at  all banks, 
taken  from  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System,  All  Bank  Statistics,  United  States, 
2869-2955.  April  1959.  For  1950-1968,  the  data  are 
figures  for  business  and  personal  demand  deposits 
at all banks,  as reported  in various  issues  of Federal 
Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  Assets and  Liabilities 
and  Capital Accounts-Commercial  and Mutual  Savings 
Banks.  For  1969-1977,  the  data  are  figures  for  de- 
mand  deposits  at  all insured  commercial  banks,  as 
reported  in various  issues  of &ets  and Liabilities and 
Capital Accoun&Gxmne&~  and Mutuui &wings Ban& 
For  1978-1988,  the  data  are  unpublished  figures  for 
demand  deposits  at  all insured  commercial  banks, 
obtained  directly  from  the  FDIC. 
Personal Income by Region,  United States,  1929-  1982: 
U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  State  Perxonai In- 
cMne: 1929-2982.  Washington,  D.C.,  February  1984. 
2983-2988:  U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  Sureq 
of Current  Business.  August  issues,  1986-1990. 
Personal  Income per  Capita  by  Region,  United  States, 
2 929- 1982:  State PersonaL  Income,  2 929- I 982  ( 1984). 
1983-1988:  Survey  of Current Businea.  August  issues, 
1986-1990. 
&wnings  by  Region  and  by  Industry,  United  States, 
1929-2982:  State PersonaiIncome,  2929-1982  (1984). 
1983-1988:  Survey of Current Business. August  issues, 
1986-1990. 
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